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Abstract
Using data from the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey 1998, this study analyzes how
much money different types of households spend for domestic services on “female” and
“male” tasks. We test alternative hypotheses based on economic and sociological theories of
gender differentiation. Contrary to arguments that marriage lowers the risk to one partner
of specializing in housework, we find no differences in service expenditures between
cohabiting and married couples. Consistent with gender production arguments that the
household context shapes behavior, single women outspend couples across the board. Single
men, however, reveal spending behavior more consistent with gender socialization.
Comparing single men and single women points to the gendered nature of the tasks as an
important aspect of domestic service expenditures.
Domestic services are purchased to alleviate time demands in the home. Outsourcing is
substituting market goods and services for one’s own labor (Bittman, Matheson and Meagher
1999). Just as firms outsource accounting or janitorial functions to independent contractors,
so do households buy substitutes for their members’ labor. Outsourced alternatives are
produced in the industrial sector (e.g., take-out dinners) and the service sector (e.g., nannies,
carpet cleaners, personal tax accountants). In the United States where housekeeping and
childcare services are often provided by undocumented Latina immigrants (Hondagneu-
Sotelo 2001), these jobs are typically unregulated by formal rules and contracts and
characterized by low pay rates. Given the increase in dual-earner families (McLanahan and
Casper 1995), domestic outsourcing is an adaptive strategy for families that have high
disposable incomes to purchase services, but less discretionary time for housework (Treas
1987). As an alternative to housewifery, domestic services may explain why women devote
less time to housework than in the 1960s (Bianchi et al. 2000). Research shows that married
couples use services in response to competing time demands of home and work (Bellante
and Foster 1984; Brayfield 1995; Cohen 1998; Hanson and Ooms 1991; Oropesa 1993;
Soberon-Ferrer and Dardis 1991). Reporting on cleaning, cooking and childcare that fall mostly
to women, studies have neglected expenditures on “male” chores around the house.
Women do most of the housework (Blair and Lichter 1991), but outsourcing studies
display little gender theorizing (but see Oropesa, 1993, and Van Dijk and Siegers, 1996). By
offsetting structural barriers to gender equality, purchased services help married women to
compete in the labor market. Outsourcing household work diminishes the demands of
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women’s “second shift” at home (Hochschild 1989). Cohabiting women may also benefit
from outsourcing, but the expenditures of cohabitors and married couples may differ.
Compared to married people, cohabitors do less housework, and both partners do more paid
work – consistent with their egalitarian views of gender (Coltrane 2000). As another incentive
to outsource, singles face gender-specific labor shortages in the home because they lack a
partner to handle chores generally assigned to the other gender.
This study investigates how spending on “gender-typed” domestic tasks in the United
States varies by living arrangements (i.e., household differences in gender composition). This
is, to our knowledge, the first study to use expenditure data to study the gendering of
domestic outsourcing. Because there is little theorizing on how outsourcing varies by
household type, we extrapolate from the literature on the household division of labor to
develop hypotheses about domestic service spending. Admittedly, expenditures are a rough
measure of outsourcing because they do not distinguish between the quantity and quality of
the domestic good or service purchased. A data set containing information about 1,114 Dutch
households reveals that the correlation between the amount of outsourcing and expenditures
is high (.6, p < .001) for home maintenance and housekeeping (Van der Lippe and Glebbeek
2004). We assume outsourcing replaces, rather than augments, the domestic labor of
household members. Lacking data on both expenditures and time use, we cannot evaluate
this assumption directly.
Theorizing on the nature of partnerships, gender and the division of household labor
informs our study. First, comparing expenditures for married and cohabiting couples tests
competing hypotheses inspired by economic and sociological theories of gender
differentiation. Second, comparing expenditures for couples with singles, and for single men
with single women, tests hypotheses from two sociological perspectives: 1) In gender
socialization, stable internalized identities supported by macro level structures of inequality
lead to consistency in gendered behavior and, 2) In gender production, gendered behavior is
fluid and situational, depending on the composition of the household.
Background
Three explanations for outsourcing have been offered. The household resources argument
says finances influence spending. The higher the household income, the more domestic
services are used (Bellante and Foster 1984; Bittman, Matheson and Meagher 1999; Cho
1993; Cohen 1998; Oropesa 1993; Spitze 1999). The time availability explanation (Hiller 1984)
argues that paid employment reduces the time available for housework. Compared to single
earner couples, dual earner couples dine out more often (Bellante and Foster 1984; Bittman,
Matheson and Meagher 1999; Cho 1993; Kim 1989; Soberon-Ferrer and Dardis 1991; Yen
1993). Some studies find that available time decreases the use of housekeeping services
(Bittman, Matheson and Meagher 1999; Cho 1993; Cohen 1998), but others do not (Bellante
and Foster 1984; Kim 1989; Oropesa 1993; Soberon-Ferrer and Dardis 1991). The demand
capability argument (Coverman 1985) argues the volume of housework raises the demand for
timesaving domestic services. The number of rooms to clean increases the demand (Van der
Lippe, Tijdens and De Ruijter 2004). Some studies find that young children affect the use of
services such as housecleaning (Bittman, Matheson and Meagher 1999), but others disagree
(Cho 1993; Cohen 1998; Soberon-Ferrer and Dardis 1991; Zick and McCullough 1996).
In addition, women with higher education make more use of housekeeping services, if not
prepared food (Bellante and Foster 1984; Cohen 1998; Soberon-Ferrer and Dardis 1991; Van
der Lippe, Tijdens and De Ruijter 2004; Yen 1993). Nonwhites spend more on housekeeping
and eating out (Cohen 1998; Yen 1993). Some studies report that age is associated with
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greater expenditures on housekeeping but lower spending on dining out (Cohen 1998;
Bittman, Matheson and Meagher 1999), while others find no age differences (Zick and
McCullough 1996). 
Studies on married couples’ time-saving expenditures do not address gender
differentiation in household responsibilities. Economic specialization theory, which assumes
the efficiency of an implicitly gendered, division of labor, has implications for outsourcing by
couples. At one extreme, neither partner does domestic work and outside help is necessary
to provide essentials (e.g., clean clothing, adequate nutrition and reasonably hygienic
surroundings). At the other extreme, one partner specializes in household chores, and there
may be little, if any, need for outside help.
Specialization 
According to the New Home Economics (Becker 1981), household well-being is maximized
when the partner with a comparative earnings advantage invests in the labor market while the
other partner concentrates on the home. Gender discrimination typically gives men the labor
force advantage. Functionalists made a similar argument: childbearing ties women to the
home where they take on “expressive” roles; men provide “instrumental” leadership based on
their ties to the occupational realm (Parsons and Bales 1955). Having one partner devoted
exclusively to the home reduces the need for outsourcing, but few couples strictly allocate
one partner’s time to the market and the other’s to the household. Extreme specialization is
vulnerable to the loss of a partner and cannot accommodate the shifting demands of the
family life course (Oppenheimer 1997). 
Risks to Specialization
Specialization is risky for the partner who concentrates on the home. Time spent in
housework depresses wages (Hersch and Stratton 2002), leading to an unequal balance of
marital power (Bernasco and Giesen 2000). Unlike investment in a career, investment in
domestic skills is tied to a specific relationship and has little value if that union ends
(Williamson [1981] 1985). Unless protected from this risk, neither partner has an incentive to
be the “housewife.” Outsourcing makes specializing in housework unnecessary, lets both
partners focus on careers and equalizes marital power.
Specializing in housework is riskier for cohabitors who lack the legal protections of
marriage (Bernasco and Giesen 2000). If a union ends, marriage in the United States is safer
than cohabitation in many respects (e.g., pension rights, division of marital property) (Smock
and Gupta 2002). By contrast, no U.S. state has codified property rights and distribution rules
for a cohabiting union that ends (Durst 1997; Rindfuss and Vandenheuvel 1990). With few
obstacles to dissolution, cohabitors are more likely than married persons to end their union
(Smock 2000). In fact, in choosing to cohabit rather than marry, they signal uncertainty and a
limited commitment that may encourage self-interested bargaining, instead of cooperation
(Brines and Joyner 1999; Rindfuss and Vandenheuvel 1990).
With more protections than cohabitors, married couples will be more likely to specialize—
devoting the time of one partner to the home and one to the labor market. Although women
do more housework than men in both partnerships, married women do more housework than
cohabiting women (Denmark, Shaw and Ciali 1985; Nock 1998; Shelton and John 1993;
South and Spitze 1994). Studies report that married men spend less time on housework than
cohabiting men (Denmark, Shaw and Ciali 1985; Kotkin 1983), but recent reports show no
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marital status differences (Gupta 1999; Shelton and John 1993; South and Spitze 1994) or find
cohabiting men less involved (Waite and Gallagher 2000).
Gender Influences
A man who earns less than his wife will not necessarily do more housework so she can focus
on her job (Brines 1994). This contradicts not only the comparative advantage logic of economic
specialization, but also the exchange theory argument that resources (e.g., income) give wives
power. Even in dual earner families, wives have more family responsibilities (Presser 1994), but
men increase their share of housework when the wife contributes a larger portion of household
income (Bianchi et al. 2000). Although higher income permits more outsourcing, men’s and
women’s earnings affect these expenditures differently (Oropesa 1993). In purchasing
housekeeping services, a wife’s earnings have more weight than her husband’s (Cohen 1998).
A wife’s earnings have the larger effect on her time spent in housework (Bianchi et al. 2000; Van
der Lippe and Siegers 1994). Husband’s and wife’s incomes have comparable effects on dining
out, which offers a recreational experience and an alternative to cooking (Cohen 1998). 
Gender-typing of chores may affect the types of tasks surrendered to outsiders (Blair and
Lichter 1991; Presser 1994; Twiggs, McQuillan and Ferree 1999). Routine chores that are
unrelenting, time-consuming or unpleasant (e.g., laundry, cleaning) typically fall to women,
whereas occasional tasks (e.g., maintenance, yard care), which are flexible, creative and even
recreational, fall to men (Hochschild 1989). Bianchi et al. (2000) distinguish “core” housework
(cooking, meal clean-up, housecleaning, laundry) from less time intensive, discretionary tasks
(outdoor chores, repairs, garden care, animal care, bill paying). From 1965 through 1995,
women dominated the core tasks while men increased their time doing male-oriented,
“other” chores. Given gender-typing of chores, specialization arguments benefit from
theorizing that incorporates gendered identities and global measures of household spending
need to be disaggregated into task-specific measures.
Because specializing in housework carries the risk of lower market earnings, we expect
outsourcing expenditures to differ for couples that marry as opposed to cohabit. To explain
differences between heterosexual couples and singles, however, we consider how gender
influences domestic behavior. Two theories start with the same assumptions – that social
structures give gendered meanings to certain behaviors and that gender is predicated on an
ideology of separate spheres (Ferree 1990; Thompson and Walker 1995). Emphasizing power
structures and belief systems, a contemporary gender socialization perspective implies that
men and women conform to internalized ideologies of gender differentiation and inequality,
independent of their household context. Partnered or not, women perform “women’s work”
and men do “masculine” tasks. The gender production approach, however, assumes that
people only act out gendered behavior under certain conditions, for example, when they have
a partner of the opposite sex. Whether gendered behavior is linked to prior socialization or
immediate circumstances, viewed as a habit or as strategic action, has important
implications. Gender socialization predicts relatively consistent acting out of gendered
behavior. Gender production predicts gendered behavior as situational and dependent on the
gender composition of the household.
Gender socialization
Because we are integrated in wider systems of economic and political power (Blumberg 1984;
Ferree 1990), macro-level gender structures and ideologies provide roadmaps for behavior.
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Gender categorization and gender stratification are key (Reskin 1988). For example, the “male
breadwinner model” keeps women at home with its essentialist idea that they are better suited
to tend children (Hochschild 1997). Internalizing gender norms and structures fosters behavior
consistent with stable gender identities. Micro-level behavior, in turn, reinforces structures of
gender inequality. Sustained by broader social structures and intimate power relations,
internalized expectations for gendered behavior influence the division of housework between
partners as well the type of housework singles perform or outsource to third parties. Egalitarian
gender beliefs may result in a more equal division of household work (Bianchi et al. 2000; Blair
and Lichter 1991; Brayfield 1992; Coltrane and Ishii-Kuntz 1992; Presser 1994), but husbands’
views may carry more weight than wives’ (Shelton and John 1996).
Gender Production
Gender socialization implies consistent behavior for men and women regardless of living
arrangements. Another theory sees gender as emergent, situational, and flexible. Gender is
created symbolically as “a routine accomplishment embedded in everyday interaction” (West
and Zimmerman 1987: 125). Produced via interactive behaviors (e.g., household labor) linked
to gender, gender need not operate at a conscious level (Berk 1985). In others’ presence, the
amount and type of housework we do will conform to shared expectations for gendered
behavior. Imbued with symbolic meanings, housework is not just work, but also an
expression of social bonds, caring, and gender (DeVault 1991). With a male partner, women
do routine housework whereas men avoid it, in part, to show their respective femininity or
masculinity. In non-couple households, men and women have less need to display gender-
linked behaviors.
Consistent with gender production, time spent on housework is higher for married and
cohabiting persons than for the never-married (South and Spitze 1994). In couples, women do
most of the housework (Blair and Lichter 1991; Nock 1998; Perkins and DeMeis 1996;
Shelton and John 1993; South and Spitze 1994). Men slack off on housework after they enter
a marriage or cohabitation, whereas women do more (Gupta 1999). Egalitarian task-sharing by
same-sex couples shows that household context elicits gendered behavior (Blumstein and
Schwartz 1983; Kurdek 1993; Sullivan 1996). If gender-coded behavior depends on the
opportunities for interaction in the home, a man in a heterosexual couple will avoid “women’s”
chores, but perform masculine tasks for his partner. A woman will perform “women’s work”
and avoid stereotypically male chores. According to gender socialization, people embrace
own-gender tasks and avoid opposite-gender tasks regardless of household context. Gender
production predicts that men and women will only display such behavior if they have a partner
of the opposite gender. Thus, situational preferences for doing gendered work shape the
demand for services.
Hypotheses
Comparing singles to couples and single women to single men, we exploit the gender-
typing of household tasks to develop alternative hypotheses about outsourcing
expenditures from gender socialization and gender production theories. We extend the
study of outsourcing to the growing number of households that are not husband-wife
units. Following South and Spitze (1994), cohabitors include currently cohabiting,
heterosexual couples, whether a partner has ever been married or not. Singles are not
married and live without a partner, regardless of past arrangements. Besides their
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composition, the married, cohabiting, and single households differ in other ways that may
affect expenditures (McLanahan and Casper 1995; Smock 2000). Having lower incomes
than couples, single men may have to do their own housework (Goldscheider and Waite
1991). Similarly, cohabiters’ spending may reflect the fact that they are more similar to
single persons than to married couples in fertility plans, employment, school enrollment,
and homeownership (Rindfuss and VandenHeuvel 1990). As expenditures are shaped by
demographic, economic, and cultural factors, as well as by our theoretical concern with
gender differentiation, we test hypotheses on spending, controlling for factors
confounding the relation of household type and spending. 
Married vs. Cohabiting Couples 
If marriage protects against the earnings risk of specializing in housework, married couples
will be more likely than cohabiters to have the female concentrate on the home. Such married
couples have less need for domestic outsourcing, particularly of “core” female tasks. Having
incentives for both partners to focus on paid work instead of housekeeping, cohabiters are
more likely to buy substitutes for their own domestic labor. 
H1a:Cohabiting couples will spend more on services than married couples. (Specialization
Hypothesis)
Neither gender theory predicts spending differences for married and cohabiting
couples. Gender production assumes that people act out gender identities when they
have a partner of the opposite sex, regardless of their partnership type. Whether married
or cohabiting, people do the tasks that demonstrate their masculinity or femininity to their
partner. Gender socialization assumes people act on gender identities. Heterosexual
couples, married or not, have someone to do male tasks and someone to do female tasks.
Extrapolating from housework to spending leads to a gender alternative to the
specialization hypothesis. 
H1b:Cohabiting and married couples will spend the same amount on services. (Gender
Production/Socialization Hypothesis)
Couple vs. Non-couple Households
If femininity or masculinity is produced for and with a partner of the opposite gender, we
expect more gendered behavior in heterosexual couples than in other households. People
without a heterosexual partner have fewer incentives or opportunities for complementary,
gendered behavior. A man without a female partner has nobody to do female chores, to
collude in his manly avoidance of “women’s work” or to appreciate his performance of
masculine tasks. Relatively indifferent to the gender-typing, singles may spend more than
couples to avoid the drudgery of both male and female tasks. 
H2a:Regardless of the gender-type of tasks, single persons will spend more on services than
heterosexual couples. (Gender Production Hypothesis)
In contrast, gender socialization links domestic activities to stable commitments to
internalized gender identities: Rather than calibrate their efforts to their partners, women will
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do “women’s work” and men will do male tasks, regardless of their living arrangements.
Because the households of couples and single women contain a woman with learned skills
and internalized motivation to do “women’s work,” they will not differ in expenditures for
female tasks. The same logic holds for men and male tasks.
H2b:Single people spend the same as heterosexual couples on own-gender domestic
tasks. (Gender Socialization Hypothesis – Own Gender Tasks)
People have less interest in, or feelings of responsibility for, the tasks associated with the
other gender. Leaving aside discomfort in trespassing gender boundaries, limited knowledge
of how to do such tasks argues for hiring help, even as it may make it hard to drive a good
bargain. Homeowners say that they hire professionals for household tasks because of their
lack of know-how, not their lack of time (Larson 1993). Without a heterosexual partner to do the
other gender’s chores, single people will spend more than couples to avoid unfamiliar tasks.
H2c:Single persons will spend more on other-gender household tasks than heterosexual
couples. (Gender Socialization Hypothesis – Other Gender Tasks)
Single Men vs. Single Women
Gender production argues that women without a male partner lack a masculine other with
whom to produce gendered behavior. They have no incentive to excel at female tasks or to
avoid male ones. Similarly, single men have less reason to avoid female housework or to
show off skill in masculine tasks than do men in heterosexual couples. Without an audience
to affect their choice of tasks, they can avoid both types of work by outsourcing. 
H3a:Single men and women will spend the same on outsourcing for all household tasks.
(Gender Production Hypothesis)
In contrast, gender socialization implies single men and women differ on expenditures
depending on the gender-type of tasks. If internalized ideologies and experience encourage
men and women to do different types of tasks, single women will do more “women’s work”
than single men. If they do own-gender tasks, there is no need to purchase substitutes for
female tasks. Similarly, single men will do more “men’s work,” outsourcing fewer masculine
tasks than their female counterparts. 
H3b:Singles will spend less money on outsourcing own-gender tasks than their single
counterparts of the other gender. (Gender Socialization Hypothesis – Own Gender Tasks)
Gender socialization implies that men and women, acting on gender expectations and
learned skills, will devote less effort to tasks associated with the other gender. Without a
female partner to do feminine tasks, single men will buy substitutes so they can avoid them.
Single women will avoid conflicting behavior by outsourcing male tasks. Single men will
spend more on female tasks than will single women, whereas single women will spend more
on male tasks than will single men. 
H3c:Single persons will spend more money outsourcing other-gender tasks than their single
counterparts of the opposite gender. (Gender Socialization Hypothesis – Other Gender
Tasks)
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Data and Methods
The Consumer Expenditure Survey 1998 (CE98) has a household probability sample
representative of the U.S. population (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1998) at a response rate of
79.9 percent. Consumer units are people who live together and share expenses. A household
may have multiple consumer units (e.g., roommates not sharing expenses). CE98 covers five
quarters with each household interviewed four times, sometimes over different years, on
expenditures and household characteristics for the prior three months. This included 14,313
consumer units. However, only 13,712 consumer units were interviewed about their spending
during 1998, so we limit our sample to these cases.
Besides household composition, labor force behavior and marital status, the CE asks about
consumer unit expenditures (e.g., clothes, accounting fees, domestic services). There are data on
money spent on two male tasks (home maintenance, gardening) and three female ones (laundry,
housekeeping, dining out). We construct two dependent variables, 1998 annual expenditures on
male and on female tasks, from quarterly expenses of the consumer unit. Expenses for the
months in 1998 are added, divided by the number of months for which data on the consumer unit
are available, and multiplied by twelve. Because the rotating panel design means some consumer
units have less than 12 months of expenditure data, some households have zero spending on
seasonal tasks (e.g., gardening, home maintenance). Controls for number of interview months
and the time of the interview month did not change our central findings. 
To equate expenditures across households, we divide yearly expenditures by the
household value on an equivalence scale, a measure of the relative costs of living for
households of different sizes and compositions (Citro and Michael 1995):
Scale value = (+)F
Scale value = (+.70).65
Where A is the number of adults in the households, K is the number of children (each
treated as a proportion P of an adult), and F is the scale economy factor.
Living arrangements
For convenience, we refer to consumer units as households. We distinguish between
married, heterosexual cohabiting, and single person households, male or female, using
dummy variables. Marital status identifies married couples and single men and women (i.e.,
never married, divorced or widowed). Absent a direct measure, cohabitation is constructed
using POSSLQ (Partners of the Opposite Sex Sharing Living Quarters), which captures almost
all self-identified cohabitors (Casper and Cohen 2000). A household is defined as a POSSLQ if
it contains (a) a reference person, (b) one other adult (age 16 +) of the opposite sex who is not
related to the reference person, and (c) no other adults (age 16 +), except the children or
other relatives of the reference person. Excluding cases that cannot be defined as a couple or
non-couple household reduces the sample to 13,266 cases.
Control variables
For household resources, we control for total consumer unit income (13 categories range
from “under $3,000” to “$75,000 or more”). We replace missing data with mean values and
include a dummy variable indicating this substitution. Excluding cases with missing income
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values does not affect the results. As a measure of household resources and the demand for
male tasks, especially home maintenance, a dummy variable indicates whether a household
owns its home as opposed to renting or having other arrangements. For time availability, a
dummy variable indicates that a couple has a single earner. As time-consuming jobs increase
the need for outsourcing, we control for the total hours household members spend in the
labor market in couple and non-couple households. For demand capability, two dummy
variables indicate the presence of children younger than 6, and between ages 6 and 17. The
number of rooms in the home is also included.
For couples, the education of the female partner has 8 categories from “never attended
school” to “professional/doctorate degree.” For 292 cohabiting couples that did not report her
education, the male’s education is used. For singles, we use the education of the reference
person. Age of the reference person indicates the demand for domestic services due to
physical limitations. Our analyses show a linear effect of age, because nonlinear effects were
not statistically significant with age-squared nor with a dummy variable for “65 and older.” A
dummy variable identifies whether the reference person is nonwhite. The summary statistics
for these variables appear in Table 1.
Method
We estimate Tobit models (Tobin 1958) to examine the impact of living arrangements on
expenditures for female and male tasks. Tobit models are appropriate when data have a
lower-boundary of zero that can lead to biased and inconsistent OLS estimates. A maximum-
likelihood procedure corrects for this limited dependent variable (Tobin 1958). Tobit models
account for the distinction between the probability of any spending and the amount spent
for those who do spend.
Results
Married vs. Cohabiting Couples
Specialization arguments and gender theories inspire alternative hypotheses tested with scale-
adjusted, outsourcing expenditures of married and cohabiting couples. In Table 2, expenditures
for couple households are regressed on cohabitation status as well as on indicators for
household resources, time availability, demand capability, and controls. The columns show the
Tobit results for total expenditures separately on female tasks (laundry, housekeeping, dining
out) and male tasks (gardening, home maintenance). Net of other variables, cohabiting and
married couples do not differ significantly on spending for either male or female tasks. Contrary
to the specialization hypothesis predicting smaller expenditures for married than cohabiting
couples, gender production predicted these similar expenditures because both partnerships
pair persons of the opposite sex to stimulate similarly “gendered” household activities. These
spending similarities are also consistent with gender socialization that leads men and women
to act in gendered ways, regardless of living arrangements.
The control variables have largely predictable effects. The hours worked by household
members increase expenditures on female tasks but decrease spending on male tasks. Single-
earner couples spend more on male tasks but do not differ significantly from dual-earners on
female tasks. Children decrease, rather than increase, spending on female and male tasks,
perhaps because youngsters do some tasks and make restaurant visits less enjoyable.
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Missing income 18% 16% 20% 20% 22%
Owned home 60% 78% 39% 46% 35%
Single earner
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- 16% 14% - -












12% 18% 17% 7% 1%
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6 – 17
33% 45% 23% 25% 8%

































Not White 16% 12% 13% 22% 15%
Source: Consumer Expenditure Survey 1998
Note: Table entries are means or percentages (as noted) and, in parentheses, standard
deviations.
aLaundry, housekeeping, dining out
bGardening, home maintenance
cEducation female partner for couple households, education reference person for single
households
Table 1: Means, Standard Deviations and Sample Sizes for Variables by Living Arrangement
Couples vs. Non-couple Households
Table 3 compares service expenditures of couple households with those of single men and
single women. Singles – men and women – spend more than couples on outsourcing female
tasks. Single women, but not single men, spend more on male tasks. That single women
outspend couples across the board is predicted by gender production: Without a male
partner, single women have little incentive to act out gendered domesticity but ample reason
to avoid the drudgery of various chores. Single men’s spending is more consistent with
gender socialization, as they spend as much as couples on own-gender, male tasks, but more
on tasks that would fall to a female partner.
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Table 2: Tobit Models of Domestic Service Expenditures: Cohabiting
Versus Married Couples
Female tasksa Male tasksb
B SE(B) B SE(B)
Marriedc - - - -
Cohabiting -17.72 75.91 29.12 165.65
Income consumer unit 119.24*** 7.41 145.14*** 15.95
Missing income 61.11 41.90 171.70* 81.46
Owned home -82.22* 40.70 1718.91*** 108.29
Single earner household 64.72 42.07 137.34* 76.66
Total hours worked 4.43*** .59 -2.79** 1.06
Presence children < 6 -288.45*** 43.79 -4.52 86.47
Presence children 6 – 17 -384.72*** 31.90 -232.01*** 58.33
# Rooms in house 44.58*** 8.05 56.66*** 13.40
Education female partner 104.92*** 9.89 164.99*** 17.79
Missing education female 326.97*** 80.81 -167.97 169.40
Age reference person 2.00 1.40 20.90*** 2.63
Not White -222.35*** 45.04 -3.37 85.19
Constant -1112.73*** 111.17 -6187.35*** 266.63
Chi2 1222.24*** 1265.80***
n 7,538 7,538
Source: Consumer Expenditure Survey 1998
aLaundry, housekeeping, dining out
bGardening, home maintenance
cReference group
*p < .05   **p < .01   ***p < .001 (one-tailed tests)
Table 2: Tobit Models of Domestic Service Expenditures: Cohabiting vs. Married Couples
Single Men vs. Single Women
Table 4 shows the results for single men and single women. Men spend more than women
on female tasks, but less on male tasks. Further analysis (not reported) reveal that single
men only spend more on dining out than single women. Their expenditures on laundry and
housekeeping are similar to single women’s. Higher dining out expenses by single men may
be due to dating norms (i.e. men are expected to pay the bill) rather than to gender
socialization of household tasks. Therefore, these results support the gender production
argument: the expenditures of single men and women on female tasks are similar. Our
results for male tasks, however, support the gender socialization expectation that people
spend less on own-gender tasks and more on other-gender chores. Single men spend less
than single women on male tasks (that men presumably do themselves). The results speak
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Table 3: Tobit Models of Domestic Service Expenditures: Couples vs.Single Men and Single Women
Table 3: Tobit Models of Domestic Service Expenditures: Couples
Versus Single Men and Single Women
Female tasksa Male tasksb
B SE(B) B SE(B)
Couplec - - - -
Single women 218.00*** 40.26 788.02*** 88.43
Single men 848.69*** 47.14 -111.89 116.95
Income consumer unit 121.67*** 6.05 147.33*** 15.59
Missing income -120.63** 38.03 -147.36 90.61
Owned home -86.03* 36.93 2888.17*** 114.72
Total hours worked 4.21*** .61 -.96 1.34
Presence children < 6 -349.16*** 45.91 59.21 113.55
Presence children 6 – 17 -391.14*** 32.34 -396.80*** 72.31
# Rooms in house 27.06*** 7.67 86.12*** 16.22
Education 144.39*** 9.37 213.12*** 20.77
Missing education 280.24** 80.91 -75.28 205.24
Age reference person -2.54* 1.09 32.67*** 2.70
Not White -261.77*** 39.53 33.16 95.00
Constant -919.76*** 92.80 -10519.52*** 353.99
Chi2 2158.53*** 2654.66***
n 12,638 12,638
Source: Consumer Expenditure Survey 1998
aLaundry, housekeeping, dining out
bGardening, home maintenance
cReference group
*p < .05   **p < .01   ***p < .001 (one-tailed tests)
only to amounts spent, and we cannot evaluate the possibility that, say, men – being more
familiar with male tasks and their requirements – obtain more services at lower cost than
their female counterparts.
Conclusion and Discussion
Gender differences in the household division of labor are the linchpin of a system of
inequality that disadvantages women not merely at home, but in all institutions (Budig
2004). Studies of housework help us to understand how this inequality is perpetuated, but
they have been incomplete. They fail to consider the domestic services that women and
men buy as substitutes for their own labor. When dual-earner couples have more money
than time, this is a serious omission. Focusing on the need for services and the money to
buy them, studies of outsourcing expenditures have largely neglected gender processes.
Drawing on theories of gender differentiation that have informed studies of housework,
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Table 4: Tobit Models of Domestic Service Expenditures: Single Men vs. Single Women
Table 4: Tobit Models of Domestic Service Expenditures: Single Men
Versus Single Women
Female tasksa Male tasksb
B SE(B) B SE(B)
Single womenc - - - -
Single men 594.02*** 60.80 -1198.81*** 181.50
Income consumer unit 130.97*** 10.82 162.67*** 32.72
Missing income -375.61*** 73.88 -778.22*** 217.57
Owned home -93.03 68.20 4449.27*** 240.12
Total hours worked 6.40*** 1.70 13.29** 5.02
Presence children < 6 -231.22* 134.60 -311.31 531.87
Presence children 6 – 17 -337.56*** 72.94 -841.28*** 203.75
# Rooms in house -5.02 15.31 119.53** 42.99
Education reference person 187.01*** 18.56 221.44*** 50.14
Age reference person -4.36* 1.93 55.42*** 6.37
Not White -305.98*** 70.34 58.00 212.18
Constant -741.22*** 158.27 -11922.67*** 613.94
Chi2 959.84*** 1402.30***
n 5,100 5,100
Source: Consumer Expenditure Survey 1998
aLaundry, housekeeping, dining out
bGardening, home maintenance
cReference group
*p < .05   **p < .01   ***p < .001 (one-tailed tests)
this article advances research by considering spending on both male and female chores.
It extends the analysis beyond husband-wife couples to the growing number of
households with cohabiting couples or single persons. The spending differences, as
predicted by gender socialization and gender production, are summarized in Table 5
together with the results of the analyses.
Table 5: Hypotheses and Results on Gender Theories
For couples, the gender socialization/production theories are superior to the specialization
argument. Our results show no statistically significant differences in spending between
cohabiting and married couples. On four tests involving singles, gender socialization and
gender production theories predicted spending differences. The results are consistent with
gender socialization for the outsourcing of male tasks. Given gender socialization, individuals
– acting on internalized ideologies of gender differentiation – will do own-gender tasks and
avoid opposite-gender chores. Accordingly, we find that single men 1) spend less than single
women on “men’s work,” and 2) spend the same as couples on male tasks. Regarding female
tasks, however, the results support gender production. The results show that 1) single
women spend the same on female tasks as single men, and 2) single women spend more on
female tasks than do couples.
These results suggest a gendered logic whereby men and women respond to different
influences on behavior. Men fall back on internalized gender ideologies, but women engage
in gender production, fluidly fine-tuning their work and spending to those around them. That
women are more sensitive to relational concerns (e.g., household composition) is not a new
idea (Gilligan 1982). The distinction between male and female tasks is important: only
“women’s work” offers evidence that women engage in gender production. However
mundane, cleaning, cooking and laundry may be gender-affirming activities for women – the
caring work of relationships and too meaningful to be casually outsourced (DeVault 1991). Or,
due to less sense of personal entitlement (Major 1993), women may be hard put to justify
spending to replace their own labor. Lastly, the sporadic nature of men’s tasks may argue for
outsourcing men’s work, because their episodic chores present fewer learning opportunities
than do women’s routine work.
Our theorizing about outsourcing extrapolated from research on the household division of
labor. Lacking data on time spent on household chores, we cannot directly examine the time-
use assumptions that motivate our hypotheses on expenditures. A couple where both partners
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Table 5: Hypotheses and Results on Gender Theories
Female tasks Male tasks











0 0 0 0 0 0
Single men
versus couples
+ + + 0 + 0
Single women
versus couples




+ 0 0 - 0 -
share housework equally might arrive at the same expenditures as a couple where one person
handles all the housework. On the other hand, studies of housework lack data on outsourcing
and proceed on the implausible assumption that household members perform all of the
household chores. To gain leverage on both issues, we need studies with detailed data on the
time allocated to household labor and the outsourcing expenditures on household tasks.
This article advances prior studies on outsourcing in three ways. First, it includes the
expenditures of increasingly common living arrangements – cohabiting couples, single men
and single women. Outsourcing is evaluated not merely as a panacea for time strapped, dual-
career couples, but also as responses to the egalitarian lifestyles of cohabitors and the
gender-specific labor shortages of singles. Second, rather than focusing on global spending
measures or on the outsourcing of stereotypically female chores, the article compares
expenditures – adjusted for household size, composition and scale economies – on both male
and female household tasks. Third, we formulate and test alternative hypotheses based on
three theories of gender differentiation – the economic specialization model, the gender
socialization approach and the feminist sociology of gender production. The article finds no
support for the hypothesis that marriage affects expenditures by reducing the risk of
specialization. Despite consistent evidence that gender socialization dictates expenditures on
male tasks, the findings for the gender production of “women’s work” are more complex. 
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